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Industry Watch: Tobacco industry attempts to undermine Article 5.3 & the 
‘good governance’ trap 
 
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control[1] (FCTC), which has now been ratified by 166 
countries, is the first global public health treaty to be developed by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and represents a crucial milestone for tobacco control.  In recognition of systematic, often 
covert tobacco industry efforts to undermine tobacco control policy, Article 5.3 of the FCTC 
specifically requires that, ‘in setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to 
tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested 
interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.’[1] The impact of Article 5.3 
depends on governments’ commitment to implementing the guidelines agreed in Durban, last 
November.[2] Given that tobacco industry success in undermining tobacco control to date has 
relied on its ability to influence policy,[3] it is perhaps unsurprising that tobacco companies lobbied 
hard against the Article 5.3 guidelines and are now trying to undermine their implementation by 
claiming that they contravene existing commitments to ‘better regulation’ and ‘good governance’.  
What the companies fail to acknowledge is that at least one major tobacco company, BAT, played 
a lead role in promoting these concepts. 
 
In the EU and the UK, the strategy being employed by major tobacco companies (both prior and 
subsequently to the agreement of the Article 5.3 guidelines) is to claim that Article 5.3 contravenes 
existing official standards on consultation because it requires complete exclusion of the tobacco 
industry from policy discussions (in fact, it merely requires that consultation should be limited to 
that which is strictly necessary and should be transparent and accountable).  Such claims are 
frequently framed within broader policy commitments to ‘better regulation’ or ‘good governance’, as 
Table 1 illustrates: 
 
Table 1: Tobacco Industry Attempts to Undermine Article 5.3 (emphases added) 
Company / 
organisation, 
context & date 
Claim in relation to Article 5.3 / proposals to limit tobacco industry interference within 
policymaking 
Prior to Article 5.3 Guidelines being agreed in Durban in November 2008 
Japan Tobacco 
International to the 
European Affairs 
Office, 12th June 
2008 
‘The benefits of stakeholder consultation have been widely recognized both at national and 
international levels and JTI, therefore, believes that the Parties [to the FCTC] should reject any 
suggestion that the tobacco industry should be excluded, whether expressly or in fact, from the 
regulatory process. Such an approach would be contrary both to accepted international 
practices, of which stakeholder consultation forms an essential part, and national constitutional 
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principles and law.  […] The protection of the legislative process should be founded on 
internationally accepted principles of Better Regulation…’[4] 
BusinessEurope 
(which BAT has 
close connections 
with1) to Jose 
Manuel Barroso 
(President of the 
European 
Commission), 29th 
August 2008 
‘BusinessEurope has always been a strong supporter of the Commission’s policy to try to 
achieve Better Regulation for growth and jobs in the EU. […] [P]roper consultation of all affected 
stakeholders carried out in accordance with the Commission’s general principles and minimum 
standards is crucial for getting an idea about the cost-effectiveness of legislation.  For this 
reason, we are seriously worried about developments in the framework of the ongoing 
negotiations within the World Health Organisation on draft guidelines that will implement Article 
5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) where one of the issues is 
the attempt by national and EU health authorities to exclude the tobacco industry from being 
consulted on policy and legislation.’[5] 
BAT response to 
the UK 
Department of 
Health discussion 
document 
‘Consultation on 
the future of 
tobacco control’, 
5th Sept 2008 
‘[W]e are concerned that the draft Guidelines pursuant to Article 5.3 of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) could result in less than full and proper consultation 
with the tobacco industry. Such a proposal would be inconsistent, not only with UK Government 
policy but with the European Commission’s commitment to open consultation. […] We request 
that the UK Government promotes in international fora, such as discussions relating to the 
development of the FCTC Guidelines, the principles of better regulation to which it is committed, 
to ensure that all relevant stakeholders, including the tobacco industry, are properly consulted 
and listened to, now and in the future, on issues affecting their businesses.’[6] 
Subsequently to Article 5.3 Guidelines being agreed in Durban in November 2008 
Imperial Tobacco 
letter to the House 
of Lords in the UK, 
28th April 2009 
After explaining that an amendment has been submitted to a Health Bill, ‘to establish a review of 
the government’s policies on engagement with the tobacco industry in line with Article 5.3,’ 
Imperial Tobacco’s letter claims that: ‘This amendment is completely opposed to the general 
principles of Better Regulation that were documented in 2006 […] Governments must 
acknowledge that to be effective, consultation must start as early as possible.  Interested parties 
should therefore be involved in the development of a policy at an early stage.’[7] 
 
What these claims do not reveal is that British American Tobacco (BAT), lobbying through various 
front groups, played a crucial role in promoting the concept of Better Regulation in the EU and the 
UK, including the notion that the European Commission must consult ‘interested parties’ and 
undertake a form of impact assessment (or cost-benefit analysis) focusing on potential costs to 
businesses.[8,9]  Internal company documents, released as a result of litigation, show that from 
1996 onwards, BAT established a coalition of companies and worked with a widely respected think 
tank, the European Policy Centre (EPC), to ensure that corporations would be included in 
European policy discussions and formally consulted early in policymaking processes.[10,11]  
These efforts included the publication by EPC, in September 2001, of an officially commissioned 
paper on business impact assessment.[12] This paper was based on work by the EPC Risk Forum 
which was chaired by BAT’s head of science and regulation.  It argues that better consultation is 
                                                 
1 BusinessEurope’s members are European Member State national federations of industries.  The UK federation is the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI).  BAT is a member of the CBI and has a history of working closely with it.  The 
current President of the CBI is Martin Broughton, who was Chair of BAT from 1998-2004.   
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needed during policy development and recommends that the Commission should establish 
'mandatory standards for consultation' which would involve stakeholders at a very early stage in 
the policymaking process. This paper is drawn on heavily in a Business Impact Assessment Pilot 
Report subsequently produced by the Commission,[13] whose recommendation that '[k]ey 
minimum standards for consultation should be implemented' appears to have been based directly 
on the EPC paper. In December 2002, precisely such Minimum Standards for consultation were 
published by the European Commission (taking effect on 1st January 2003).[14] As might be 
expected, these standards stress the need for early consultation with interested parties and, 
according to interviews we undertook in September 2008, were being interpreted by Commission 
staff (even those in the Directorate General for Health and Consumers) as requiring in-person 
consultation with the tobacco industry. It is not yet clear whether this interpretation has changed 
since the strong guidelines on the implementation of Article 5.3 were agreed in November 2008[2]. 
 
Paradoxically, the Minimum Standards were also part of a drive to improve governance in the 
EU[15] following a major scandal at the Commission in 1999, in which 20 Commissioners resigned 
over allegations of nepotism and corruption.[16] Therefore, as well as emphasising the need to 
consult widely, they stress the importance of transparency and ‘good governance’ in consultation 
processes, warn against allowing particular groups to gain privileged access to the Commission 
and specifically state that interested parties must themselves operate in a transparent manner, 
making clear which interests they represent. Whilst this has the potential to reinforce the principles 
underlying Article 5.3, in practice its interpretation has been appropriated by business lobbyists, 
who have successfully linked ‘open’ governance (within the EU at least) to wide consultation with 
business representatives, including the tobacco industry.[4,5]  The idea that good governance in 
tobacco control can be achieved through routinely consulting the tobacco industry is, of course, 
absurd.  However, BAT appears to have been able to covertly contribute to the policy 
developments in the EU that were explicitly intended to overcome problems of inappropriate and 
non-transparent policy influence.  Hence, it is perhaps less surprising that it first seems that such 
policy developments are now being used by tobacco companies to try to secure their inclusion in 
policy discussions. 
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In summary, lobbying by BAT has played an important role in securing the production of Minimum 
Standards for consultation in the EU and the tobacco industry is now deploying these same 
Standards in its attempts to weaken the EU’s interpretation of Article 5.3.  A similar strategy is 
being employed in the UK, where BAT and Imperial Tobacco have both appropriated the policy 
commitments to consultation that are made within ‘Better Regulation’ strategies to challenge Article 
5.3.[6,7]  Thus, it would seem that the claims being made by tobacco companies about Article 5.3 
(Table 1) are an attempt to secure tobacco industry consultation on the basis of commitments and 
guidelines that were introduced at least partly as a result of the industry’s political influence.  
Although we do not yet have the evidence to link BAT’s lobbying activities to policy reforms beyond 
the EU, it is clear from the documents that BAT intended to undertake similar activities in other 
regions.[8]  We also know that commitments to ‘better regulation’ and ‘good governance’ have now 
been made in a wide range of countries, including in Australia,[17] Ireland[18] and various other EU 
member states (e.g. Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden[19]). These developments 
include commitments to consulting widely and, in most cases, particular emphasis is placed on 
consulting businesses, thus potentially enabling tobacco companies to make similar claims about 
Article 5.3 to those already made in the UK and EU (see Table 1).  Indeed, there is already 
evidence that such lobbying is taking place in Australia.[20-22] 
 
Although strong guidelines were agreed for Article 5.3 in Durban last November, it is unclear how 
Parties to the FCTC that have also signed up to principles of ‘Better Regulation’ or ‘good 
governance’ will address tobacco companies’ contention that there is a tension between the two 
commitments.  The fact that Article 5.3 makes it clear that necessary consultation can still take 
place as long as it is transparent and accountable, suggests that claims the two are in some way 
incompatible have been overstated.  However, if policy officials believe there is a tension, there is a 
risk that they may feel compelled to implement the guidelines in a more relaxed or piecemeal 
manner than they otherwise might.  In addition, given that Article 5.3 focuses on public health 
policy, tobacco control policies which fall beyond the remit of health ministries (e.g. taxation) may 
be particularly susceptible to tobacco companies’ attempts to secure their inclusion in policy 
discussions.  If this happens, the potential for the FCTC to help reduce the fatal impact of tobacco 
use could be severely undermined.  The tobacco control community therefore needs to keep a 
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careful eye on tobacco companies’ use of terms such as ‘better regulation’ and ‘good governance’ 
and ensure that policymakers are not duped into believing their claims about Article 5.3. 
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